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Framing and Responding to Scientific Uncertainties: Biofuels and Synthetic Biology at 
the Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
Scientific uncertainty is a persistent characteristic of many issues under international 
environmental governance, both in our understanding the current state of the environment and 
our ability to track the causes and magnitude of harms.1 In international environmental law 
and policy, a key tool guiding decision-making in the face of scientific uncertainty is the 
precautionary principle/approach.2 Since its initial debut in international environmental 
treaties in the mid-1980s, it has attracted controversy. A key point of dispute is whether it has 
achieved the status of a principle of customary international environmental law, and thus 
applies to all countries.3 In the context of a treaty that includes a specific version of 
precaution, however, its legal character is not in question; Parties to the treaty have agreed to 
be bound. Even in such cases, precaution still draws attention and controversy, raising 
questions of what regulatory responses are justified or even required by it.4  
 
This paper examines how precaution has been interpreted and applied in the context of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’s engagement with “New and Emerging Issues.” The 
Convention text notes that: “where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of 
biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.”5 This “precautionary approach,” as 
it is generally referred to within the CBD, is frequently invoked in the treaty’s outputs. These 
invocations rarely explicitly declare what a stance of precaution entails. By tracing 
contending framings of scientific uncertainty in these debates, this paper argues that a narrow 
framing of scientific uncertainties influences how issues are understood and shapes the legal 
and policy tools for response.  
 
This research is based on participant observation of CBD negotiating events from 2010 to 
2014, “observant participation”6 as an intern and a consultant with the CBD Secretariat in 
2013 and 2014, document analysis, and semi-structured interviews with Secretariat staff, 
State delegates, and civil society observers. An ethnographic approach to policy and law-
making processes can trace narratives and concepts as they are gradually institutionalized into 
                                                        
1 Rosie Cooney, From Promise to Practicalities: The Precautionary Principle in Biodiversity Conservation and 
Sustainable Use, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, 3, 5 (Rosie Cooney & Barney Dickson, 
eds. 2005); Brian Wynne, Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: Reconceiving Science and Policy in the 
Preventive Paradigm, 2 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 111, 114 (1992). 
2 The terms “principle” and “approach” do not have different legal weight, but politically are often used to 
indicate different interpretations of the meaning of precaution. Jacqueline Peel, Precaution – A Matter of 
Principle, Approach, or Process? 5 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 483 (2004).   
3 Countries can avoid obligations from a customary principle of international law by being a “persistent 
objector” during its development. For debate on the existence of a precautionary principle, see: Christopher D. 
Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ELR NEWS & ANALYSIS 10790 (2001); Indur M. Goklany, THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT (2001); Peel, supra 
note 2. 
4 See: John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WILLIAM AND MARY ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 13 (2002); Peel, supra note 2. 
5 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, preamble para. 9, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div/N7-INC.S/4, 
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter CBD]. 
6 After David Mosse, as referenced in Maia Green, Delivering Discourse, 1 CRITICAL POLICY STUDIES 139, 141 
(2007).  
policies and programs that make up a field of governance.7 This can be considered a process 
of co-production, by which orderings of nature and society (such as scientific knowledge and 
governing mechanisms) are produced together and often serve to reinforce each other.8 The 
concept of co-production has particular salience at the international level, as globalization and 
new means of producing and assessing knowledge about a “global environment” have 
developed together.9 Just as dominant ways of knowing are co-produced with systems to 
govern the known, dominant understanding of uncertainties are co-produced with systems to 
govern what is not known. 
 
The CBD and New and Emerging Issues 
The processes of decision-making examined here result in “Decisions” by the CBD’s 
Conference of the Parties (COP). The CBD is widely recognized as a framework agreement in 
that it: 1) gives Parties considerable freedom to determine how to implement its provisions; 
and 2) explicitly allows the COP to negotiate legally binding protocols.10 Outside of a 
protocol, however, outcomes of a CBD COP are not generally understood to bind Parties to 
specific actions. Rather, COP Decisions indicate agreement among the 194 CBD Parties on 
the boundaries of a given problem, desirable steps towards solutions, and principles to guide 
collaboration. They have the status of soft law – formal, but not legally binding.11 
 
As the first step in developing a COP Decision, the CBD Secretariat drafts a set of “suggested 
Recommendations” for the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, and Technological 
Advice (SBSTTA). The SBSTTA, a technical advisory body to the explicitly political COP, 
agrees on “Recommendations” that serve as the basis for COP negotiations. These 
Recommendations are often heavily bracketed, indicating lack of consensus. At the COP, 
negotiations occur in large Working Group sessions, intended to include all Parties, and 
Contact Groups or Friends of the Chair, smaller meetings of interested Parties and observers. 
The CBD is notable for its openness12; other UN treaties often operate by closed meetings, 
either for only Party delegates or just a subset of Parties, but at the CBD formal sessions are 
almost always open.13 
 
In 2006, the CBD COP introduced a new mechanism, “New and Emerging Issues” (NEI), to 
allow issues of particular novelty and urgency to be added to the SBSTTA’s agenda.14 This 
was not expected to trigger controversy; NEI was seen as formalizing a long-standing practice 
of introducing issues of relevance to the treaty system.15 However, in 2007 SBSTTA 12 
                                                        
7 Catherine Corson, Shannon Hagerman & Noella J. Gray, Capturing the Personal in Politics: Ethnographies of 
Global Environmental Governance, 14 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 21, 28 (2014). 
8 Sheila Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co-production, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE 
AND SOCIAL ORDER 1, 2 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004). 
9 Christophe Bonneuil & Lew Levidow, How Does the World Trade Organization Know? The Mobilization and 
Staging of Scientific Expertise in the GMO Trade Dispute, 42 SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE 75, 76 (2011). 
10 Secretariat interviews 2013; LYLE GLOWKA, ET AL. A GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 
(IUCN, 1994). 
11 For more on soft law, see: Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, in 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 349 (David Hunter, James Salzman & Durwood Zaelke 
eds, 2nd ed, 2002). 
12 Elisa Morgera & Elsa Tsioumani. Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. 21 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, fn. 113 (2010).  
13 Chairs generally restrict the vocal engagement of observers and non-Parties, but they are allowed in the room, 
and sometimes are granted the opportunity to speak.  
14 See Decision VIII/10 Annex A(d), ‘Operations of the Convention’ (15 June 2006), found in ‘Eighth Meeting 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31, 15 June 2006). 
15 CBD Secretariat interviews 2013. 
identified biofuels as the first NEI after contentious discussions.16 This began years of 
negotiations marked by disagreement and often acrimony, as CBD Parties debated how the 
treaty should respond. Although almost all of the possible options for response would be 
legally soft, bodies such as the EU could incorporate CBD guidelines into formal certification 
processes, thus ‘hardening’ them. 
 
Much of the debate has revolved around the uncertain impacts of biofuel production and use. 
For example, as discussed below, the role of indirect land-use change (ILUC) has been 
debated. ILUC describes displacement effects; biofuel production could cause ILUC if a land 
use such as pastoralism was displaced for biofuel feedstock, and other land was converted to 
replace the lost pastoral lands.17 Taking such indirect impacts into account can significantly 
impact the total carbon and GHG emissions and other impacts on biodiversity attributed to 
any given biofuel project. Calculating ILUC is “extremely difficult and fraught with 
uncertainty.”18 The impacts and extent of ILUC cannot be directly observed, and thus 
scientists and policy-makers are reliant on models, which display a broad range of results 
because of differences in starting assumptions, model design, and resolution.19 
 
Narratives of ‘next generation’ biofuels promise to avoid the social, ecological and economic 
challenges of conventional biofuels, by providing technologies that will produce fuel from 
waste and create feedstocks that grow quickly and affordably on marginal lands.20 Synthetic 
biology has been broadly considered a key approach to developing viable next generation 
biofuels,21 and was introduced to the CBD biofuels discussions in 2010 at SBSTTA 16. 
Synthetic biology is commonly described as 1) the design and construction of new biological 
parts, devices, and systems, and 2) the re-design of existing, natural biological systems for 
useful purposes.22 Critical civil society groups describe synthetic biology as “extreme genetic 
engineering,” because genetic design and synthesis technologies make possible the production 
of more novel organisms.23 While some argue that the greater precision of synthetic biology 
tools decrease uncertainties regarding ecological, human health and other impacts,24 others 
argue that synthetic biology opens up new areas of uncertainty.25 As a group of policy 
analysis and ecologists have pointed out: “No one yet understand the risks that synthetic 
                                                        
16 Xenya Cherny Scanlon et al. Summary of the twelfth meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical 
and Technological Advice and second meeting of the Ah Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Review of 
Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity: 2-13 July 2007, 9 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 7 
(2007).  
17 T. Searchinger et al., Use of US Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from 
Land-Use Change, 319 SCIENCE 1238, 1238 (2008); Lorenzo Di Lucia et al., The Dilemma of Indirect Land-Use 
Changes in EU Biofuel Policy, 16 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & POLICY 9, 9 (2012). 
18 NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BIOFUELS: ETHICAL ISSUES, xxi (2001). 
19 Di Lucia et al, supra note 17. 
20 Simonetta Zarrilli. Development of the emerging biofuels market, in GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE: THE 
NEW RULES OF THE GAME, 73, 93 (Andreas Goldthau & Jan Martin Witte eds, 2010). 
21 Adrian Mackenzie, Synthetic Biology and the Technicity of Biofuels, 44 STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 
OF BIOLOGICAL AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES 190, 190 (2013). 
22 This definition comes from a website initiated by synthetic biologists at MIT and Harvard: 
http://syntheticbiology.org/, accessed on 22 September 2015. Discussion on the lack of a common definition can 
be found in: Various, What’s in a Name? 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1071 (2009). 
23 FRIENDS OF THE EARTH ET AL., THE PRINCIPLES FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 2 (2012). 
24 See, for example: Victor de Lorenzo, Environmental Biosafety in the Age of Synthetic Biology: Do We Really 
Need a Radical New Approach? 32 BIOESSAYS 926 (2010). 
25 See, for example: Allison A. Snow & Val H. Smith. Genetically Engineered Algae for Biofuels: A Key Role 
for Ecologists, 62 BIOSCIENCE 765 (2012). 
organisms pose to the environment, what kinds of information are needed to support rigorous 
assessments, or who should collect such data.”26 
 
Since 2010, CBD COP Decisions on biofuels have addressed synthetic biology.27 At the same 
time, the issue has been under on-going consideration as a stand-alone NEI. Since biofuels 
were named the first NEI, the CBD COP has elaborated a formal process for identifying NEI, 
with seven criteria, including: relevance of the issues to the Convention’s objectives; new 
evidence of unexpected and significant impacts on biodiversity; and urgency.28 Since the NEI 
criteria were developed, no substantive issue has been added to the CBD’s agenda through 
this mechanism.29  
 
The next sections describe three instances of the treaty bodies’ engagement with various kinds 
of uncertainties related to biofuels and synthetic biology. 
 
Biofuels at COP 10: Narrowing the Range of Uncertainties 
The COP 10 biofuel negotiations were based on the SBSTTA 14 Recommendations, which 
included numerous bracketed references to scientific uncertainty and the need for 
precaution.30 These Recommendations prompted debate on the status of scientific knowledge 
and contending framings of scientific uncertainties relating to biofuels. Below, I map actors’ 
descriptions onto four categories of scientific uncertainty and examine how these different 
framings corresponded with expressions of the relevance and meaning of precaution. 
 
The term “scientific uncertainty” encompasses a broad range of ways and qualities of not 
knowing.  When categorized by characteristics that impact decision-making, relevant 
categories include: risk, uncertainty, ambiguity, and ignorance. Risk refers to situations in 
which potential outcomes can be identified and their probabilities attributed.31 Uncertainty 
describes a situation in which the types and scales of possible harms are understood, but their 
probabilities are not.32 Ambiguity refers to situations in which, rather than the probability of 
harm being in question, the meaning of the harm is unclear or contested.33 In situations of 
                                                        
26 Genya V. Dana et al., Four Steps to Avoid a Synthetic-Biology Disaster, 483 NATURE 29, 29 (2012). 
27 See Decision X/37 ‘Biofuels and Biodiversity’ (20 January 2011), found in ‘Report of the Tenth Meeting of 
the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27*, 20 January 
2011), Annex; Decision XI/27 ‘Biofuels and Biodiversity’ (5 December 2012), found in ‘Report of the Eleventh 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (UNEP/CBD/COP/11/35, 5 
December 2012), Annex I. 
28 Decision IX/29 para. 12 ‘Operations of the Convention’ (9 October 2008), found in ‘Report of the Ninth 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29*, 9 
October 2008), Annex I. 
29 Tropospheric ozone was unceremoniously added as an NEI in 2012, but the NEI criteria were not explicitly 
applied, and the treaty bodies have given it minimal attention. CBD Secretariat interview 2012. 
30 SBSTTA Recommendation XIV/10 ‘Agricultural Biodiversity’ part B (30 June 2010), found in ‘Report of the 
Fourteenth Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice’ 
(UNEP/CBD/COP/10/3, 30 June 2010), Annex.  
31 Wynne, supra note 1; Andy Stirling, Risk, Precaution and Science: Towards a More Constructive Policy 
Debate, 8 EMBO REPORTS, 309, 310 (2007). 
32 This paper uses “scientific uncertainty” as the broadest category encompassing these different types, and 
“uncertainty” as one specific type. ULRIKE FELT ET AL. TAKING EUROPEAN KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY SERIOUSLY: 
REPORT OF THE EXPERT GROUP ON SCIENCE AND GOVERNANCE TO THE SCIENCE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIETY 
DIRECTORATE, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR RESEARCH, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 36 (2007); Stirling, supra note 
31, at 310. 
33 Andy Stirling, Science, Precaution, and the Politics of Technological Risk: Converging Implications in 
Evolutionary and Social Scientific Perspectives, 1128 ANNALS OF NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 95 (2008); 
Stirling, supra note 31, at 310. 
ignorance, not all of the possible impacts can be predicted or even understood; we don't know 
what it is we don't know.34 
 
 Risk  
Numerous delegations to COP 10 framed biofuels as well understood - ie, as “risks,” with 
identifiable potential outcomes for which probabilities could be attributed. On the first day of 
formal negotiations on biofuels, several South American delegations called for the deletion of 
reference to scientific uncertainty,35 because it did not reflect the “reality” of scientific 
knowledge36 or the “complexity” of the issue.37 To support their assertion that biofuels 
presented no unknowns, the Brazilian delegation argued throughout the negotiations for a 
narrow scope to the biofuels Decision.  Brazil tried to remove: mentions of direct and indirect 
impacts on land and water use because that is broader than biodiversity38; biosafety concerns 
because they are not unique to biofuels39; and mention of synthetic biology because it is used 
more broadly than for biofuels.40 By narrowing the issues of concern, areas of uncertainty 
would be restricted to the better understood aspects of biofuel production, leaving only 
manageable risks. 
 
The strongest advocates for a “risk” framing of biofuels also argued that precaution should 
not be invoked at all. Brazil and Argentina delegations consistently pushed to rid the Decision 
of any mention of the precautionary approach.41 As a businessman on the Brazilian delegation 
explained at a side event, the impacts of producing sugar in Brazil are “very clear…we don’t 
need to adopt the precautionary approach or principle to produce sugarcane.”42 
 
While these delegations argued that understood risks do not require precaution, the EU 
delegation only invoked the need for precaution in the biofuel negotiations where scientific 
evidence of harm existed (ie, risks). The EU delegation insisted that biofuels be mentioned in 
relation to invasive alien species, and that the precautionary approach be invoked, because 
there is scientific evidence that biofuel crops have become invasive.43 On the other hand, the 
EU delegation argued against including synthetic biology in the biofuels Decision because 
there was “not sufficient scientific evidence” to justify its inclusion.44 
 
 Uncertainty 
Some delegations framed biofuels as presenting known challenges – they would list off areas 
of impacts – but lacking sufficient scientific evidence to allow for prediction and full 
understanding. For example, Tunisia described information on biofuels’ impacts on 
biodiversity and socio-economic conditions as “quite pathetic,” and requiring a scientific 
                                                        
34 Wynne, supra note 1, at 114; Stirling supra note 31, at 310. 
35 COP 10, Working Group I, 21 October 2010: Brazil, Paraguay & Argentina. 
36 COP 10, Working Group I, 21 October 2010: Brazi. 
37 COP 10, Working Group I, 21 October 2010: Argentina. 
38 COP 10, Biofuels Contact Group, 25 October 2010. 
39 COP 10, Biofuels Contact Group, 26 October 2010. 
40 COP 10, Working Group I, 21 October 2010; COP 10, Biofuels Contact Group, 26 October 2010; COP 10, 
Biofuels Friends of the Chair, 27 October 2010. 
41 This occurred at: COP 10 Working Group 1, 21 October 2010; COP 10, Biofuels Contact Group, 21 & 26 
October 2010; COP 10, Biofuels Friends of the Chair, 27 October 2010. 
42 COP 10, side event ETC Group, 18 October 2010. 
43 The Biofuel Contact Group was tasked with developing a paragraph on biofuels for the Invasive Alien Species 
Decision. COP 10, Biofuels Contact Group, 21 October 2010. 
44 COP 10, Working Group I, 21 October 2010. 
evaluation.45 Similarly, Algeria warned that the stakes were high – biofuels could destroy 
basic systems of production – but they lacked “enough data to respond to these issues.”46  
 
Uncertainty was essentially expressed as gaps in knowledge on impacts. Precaution was then 
framed as a necessary stop-gap, urging a pause in production until the situation was better 
understood. Algeria phrased it as an “ounce of cure” instead of an infection after.47  
 
 Ambiguity 
Few interventions at COP 10 dwelt on the contested meaning of harms posed by biofuels. A 
representative from UNEP and UN Energy came close, noting that biodiversity impacts were 
difficult to address with the “typical kind of indicators,” and thus the precautionary principle 
was “critical.”48 Indeed, as discussed later, methods for measuring or modelling impacts of 
biofuels on biodiversity, particularly at a large scale, are highly contentious. This 
representative seemed to imply that, because biodiversity impacts could not be reliably 
measured, precaution should be applied. She did not describe what this application should 
look like, but tying it to the unique challenges of measuring biodiversity impacts, she seemed 
to be calling for essentially an institutionalization of precaution.  
 
 Ignorance 
Party delegations stressing the unknown aspects of synthetic biology, such as the Africa 
Group, the Philippines and Bolivia, argued for a moratorium on the environmental release of 
organisms produced using synthetic biology. The Philippines delegation often portrayed the 
state of knowledge of synthetic biology as ignorance, noting that there was no “scientific 
certainty” on the impacts, and that a moratorium could be lifted once there was “scientific 
certainty.”49 The Philippines thus called for acting with precaution until synthetic biology’s 
impacts were known to be safe. Flipping the burden of proof – demanding proof of safety 
rather than evidence of specific danger – is one interpretation of the precautionary approach.50 
 
Civil society groups intervened throughout the biofuel negotiations to claim a lack of 
understanding of the impacts of biofuels and, especially, of organisms produced using 
synthetic biology.51 As a representative of the Federation of German Scientists argued in a 
session of the Contact Group, “we do not know how to assess” the organisms modified to 
enable biofuel processing.52 These groups did not call for more research to quantify known 
impacts; they claimed a state of ignorance in how to identify and assess impacts. Their 
comments verged on describing the impacts of synthetic biology as not just unknown but 
unknowable. 
 
 Outcomes of Uncertainty at COP 10 
As expressed by actors over the course of COP 10, biodiversity-related aspects of biofuels 
involve a range of kinds of uncertainties. Decision X/37 does not reflect this range. Rather 
than “acknowledging scientific uncertainty,” the preambular paragraph recognizes “gaps in 
                                                        
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 COP 10, Biofuels Contact Group, 26 October 2010. 
50 Peel, supra note 2, 486. 
51 For example, at: COP 10 Working Group I, 21 October 2010; COP 10, Biofuels Contact Group, 26 & 27 
October 2010. 
52 COP 10, Biofuels Contact Group, 26 October 2010. 
scientific knowledge and concerns that exist regarding such impacts.”53 The one explicit call 
to apply the precautionary approach is “to the introduction and use of living modified 
organisms for the production of biofuels as well as to the field release of synthetic life, cell, or 
genome into the environment, acknowledging the entitlement of Parties, in accordance with 
domestic legislation, to suspend the release of synthetic life, cell, or genome into the 
environment.”54 
 
Describing scientific uncertainties as “gaps in knowledge” frames biofuels as knowable, even 
if not currently known – essentially acknowledging risks and uncertainties, but not the more 
complex situations of ambiguity and ignorance. It ignores broader difficulties and concerns 
with identifying and measuring the impacts of biofuels on biodiversity and related 
socioeconomic impacts. The precautionary approach is restricted to synthetic biology and 
living modified organisms55 - the uncertainties they pose are not described, and neither is 
what “precaution” means for biofuel production and use. Suspending environmental release is 
one possible application of precaution, but the Decision’s language painfully avoids 
recommending such action – if Parties have national legislation for this, well then, they are 
entitled to do that. It is a thin application of precaution to a narrow slice of the controversies 
and uncertainties posed by biofuels. 
 
If biofuels pose only “gaps” in knowledge, what happens to aspects that fall outside of 
scientific measurement, monitoring, and ways of knowing? What happens over time if the 
precautionary approach is invoked without engaging its substantive meaning? Subsequent to 
COP 10, the CBD has come up against both of these challenges in its engagement with 
biofuels and synthetic biology.  
 
Biofuels after COP 10: Responding to the challenge of indirect land-use change.  
Before COP 11, the CBD Secretariat published a technical series paper, Biofuels and 
Biodiversity, which described ILUC as causing known harms but challenging quantification 
of these harms in terms of “scale and severity.”56 The inability to accurately quantify ILUC 
impacts is not framed as a temporary challenge, but rather the result of fundamental 
differences in methodologies and key assumptions.57 Thus, the Secretariat can be seen as 
describing ILUC as an intractable uncertainty, for which the type of harm is understood, but 
the scale and probability are fundamentally unknowable.  
 
For the 16th meeting of SBSTTA, the CBD Secretariat prepared suggested text requesting 
SBSTTA to assess the effectiveness of tools and approaches for strategic environmental 
assessment of biofuels and integrated land-use planning. This would have required grappling 
                                                        
53 Decision X/37, supra note 27, preamb. para. 2. 
54 Ibid, para. 16. The Decision on Invasive Alien Species also includes a paragraph calling for the application of 
the precautionary approach in using invasives as feedstock for biofuels. Decision X/38 ‘Invasive Alien Species’ 
para. 6 (20 January 2011), found in ‘Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’ (UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27*, 20 January 2011), Annex.  
55 “Living modified organisms” is a term of art specific to the CBD that is generally understood to align with the 
more common term “genetically modified organisms.” The Decision also invites Parties to “tak(e) into account 
paragraph 3 of Decision IX/2,” which includes the precautionary approach among a list of eleven relevant tools 
and guidance. Ibid, para. 8. Legally, therefore, Parties are invited to take precaution into account in interpreting 
the entire Decision X/37, but politically such an oblique mention is understood to downplay this. Throughout the 
NEI negotiations delegations have fiercely debated whether to use specific language or merely cite past 
Decisions using that language. 
56 ANNIE WEBB & DAVID COATES. BIOFUELS AND BIODIVERSITY, 7 & 38. Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Technical Series No. 65. (2012).  
57 Ibid, at 43. 
with the uncertainties inherent in these tools. Instead, the ‘action point’ in the 2012 COP 11 
Decision requests the Secretariat to “compile information on relevant definitions of relevant 
key terms.”58 
 
In response, the CBD Secretariat’s 2014 report on definitions included a section on “direct 
and indirect land use change.”59 Monitoring and managing ILUC is described as “difficult and 
complex,” and ILUC is a “key issue regarding the sustainability of biofuels production and 
use with regard to biodiversity.”60 The Secretariat explains that, because of ILUC, biofuel 
production can not be defined as “sustainable” based on site-specific factors, and that models 
are necessarily required.61 
 
At SBSTTA 18, some delegations strenuously argued that the report and its reflections on 
ILUC were “unbalanced” and “incomplete.”62 A Brazilian delegate said that the report’s 
discussion on ILUC failed to acknowledge that models “lack accurate methodology” for 
“precise results,” and that therefore assessments of ILUC were not only uncertain but also 
“unobservable, unverifiable, and reliant on assumed economic and social contexts in the 
modelling.”63 An Argentinian delegate noted that there was no “international consensus” on 
ILUC because of the “difficulty in quantifying” it.64 SBSTTA 18 ultimately requested the 
Secretariat to revise the document and submit it to further peer-review.65 
 
ILUC presents a threat that, as Brazil said, is “not something verified nor verifiable.”66 There 
is no clear timeline or path by which the attendant uncertainties in measuring or managing 
ILUC will be resolved. The message from Brazil and Argentina was that the difficulties in 
quantifying ILUC meant that data on the phenomenon was an unreliable and thus 
unjustifiable basis for environmental policy.  
 
Social scientists have noted that decision-makers often overstate the degree to which scientific 
uncertainties can be reduced and resolved.67 This arguably happened at COP 10, as a broad 
range of uncertainties were described as “gaps in knowledge.” In the case of indirect land use 
change, however, its complexity was not reframed as something simpler. Instead, Parties 
essentially argued that the issue could be not addressed because it was indeterminate – ie, 
context specific, embedded in co-evolving “social, technological, and natural systems.”68 
                                                        
58 Decision XI/27, supra note 27, para. 10. 
59 CBD Executive Secretary, Biofuels and Biodiversity: Information on Relevant Definitions of Relevant Key 
Terms to Enable Parties to Implement Decisions IX/2 and X/37. (UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/18/15, 26 April 2014). 
60 Ibid, 4. 
61 Ibid. 
62 SBSTTA 18, Plenary, 26 June 2014, Brazil & Argentina. 
63 Ibid, Brazil. 
64 Ibid, Argentina. 
65 Recommendation XVIII/12 ‘Biofuels and Biodiversity: Information on Relevant Definitions of Relevant Key 
Terms to Enable Parties to Implement Decisions IX/2 and X/37’ (28 June 2014), found in ‘Report of the 
Eighteenth Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice’ 
(UNEP/CBD/COP/12/3, 28 June 2014), Annex. 
66 SBSTTA 18, Plenary, 26 June 2014. 
67 Steve Hinchliffe, Indeterminacy In-Decisions – Science, Policy and Politics in the BSE (Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy) Crisis, 26 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS 182, 183 (2001); 
NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, EMERGING BIOTECHNOLOGIES: TECHNOLOGY, CHOICE AND THE PUBLIC 
GOOD, 51 (2012). 
68 Felt et al., supra note 32, at 36. 
Brazil and Argentina framed such indeterminate uncertainties as illegible to the CBD,69 and 
thus not requiring a response from the treaty bodies. 
 
Synthetic biology after COP 10: applying NEI criteria in the absence of evidence. 
Since the 2010 COP 10, CBD bodies have been actively considering whether to add synthetic 
biology as an NEI to the agenda of the CBD, but have not yet made a decision. When Parties 
submitted only a handful of documents, the next COP allowed the Secretariat to take a more 
active role. Decision XI/11 requested the Secretariat to “compile and synthesize relevant 
available information” of synthetic biology and its potential impacts on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity and associated social, economic and cultural considerations, 
and to analyse how the NEI criteria applied.70 Thus, synthetic biology became the first issue 
to which the Secretariat was asked to explicitly apply the NEI criteria.71  
 
As the consultant responsible for drafting this document, I encountered several layers of 
ambiguity. It was an open question whether each criterion needed to be met in order to 
qualify as an NEI. At the 2012 negotiations, delegations seemed to generally share the 
assumption that synthetic biology would not meet criterion (b): “new evidence of significant 
impacts on biodiversity,” but disagreed on what this meant. Some delegations insisted this 
meant that synthetic biology did not meet the standard of an NEI,72 while others countered 
that Decision IX/29 could be interpreted as not requiring each criterion, or even that Parties 
had the political power to change the criteria.73 The COP 11 Decision provided no guidance 
on this, simply requesting the Secretariat to “apply” the criteria. 
 
Furthermore, applying the criteria was not a straightforward task. The simple answer to 
criterion (b) is that there is not new evidence of significant impacts of synthetic biology on 
biodiversity.74 Most research was not at the stage of commercialization, and the impacts of 
products that had been commercialized were not systematically tracked. But what meaning 
should be attributed to this lack of evidence? Did it highlight the lack of research 
investigating ecological impacts of organisms and products of synthetic biology, or associated 
socio-economic impacts? Did it raise questions of the timing of the CBD’s engagement with 
emerging issues? Or did it simply mean that, for the purposes of the CBD, synthetic biology 
was of no concern? 
 
The Secretariat document applying the criteria did not attempt to answer these questions, or 
the overall question of whether the criteria had been “met.” Rather, it pointed to how the 
compiled evidence spoke to the criteria and some of the ways this could be interpreted.75 At 
the June 2014 SBSTTA 18 meeting, delegations repeatedly clashed over different 
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interpretations of the criteria and their application. The Brazilian delegation described 
knowledge on synthetic biology as “incipient” and “not mature enough” to be taken up as an 
NEI.76 Canada did not believe the “state of knowledge is sufficient” to determine whether 
synthetic biology was an NEI.77 Delegations such as the EU, Austria, and Bolivia countered 
that the Secretariat’s analysis showed that the criteria were met.78 Some delegations simply 
stated that synthetic biology was an NEI, without referencing the criteria.79 
 
The SBSTTA 18 Recommendation on NEI concluded that there was “currently insufficient 
information available to finalize an analysis, using the criteria set out in paragraph 12 of 
Decision IX/29, to decide whether or not this is a new and emerging issue,” and “awaits the 
completion of a robust analysis.”80 The Mexican delegate voiced the apparently shared 
expectation that the results of this future analysis would “say whether (synthetic biology) is 
emerging or not!”81 
 
There was consensus at SBSTTA 18 that the COP should urge Parties to “take a 
precautionary approach,” but no agreement on what this entailed.82 The CBD’s engagement 
with synthetic biology overall displays treatment of the precautionary approach as a 
‘boundary object.’ Boundary objects are concepts “plastic enough to adapt to local 
needs…yet robust enough to maintain a common identity.”83 While this flexibility allows 
delegates to agree on text despite a lack of consensus, it can also facilitate avoidance of 
differences, deferring conflict.84 In this case, when Parties were confronted with a lack of 
scientific evidence - a situation that might call for actually applying precaution and not merely 
invoking it – Parties chose to delay decision-making in the hope that a technical process, 
rather than a political one, would provide answers.  
 
Moving Forward: Scientific Uncertainties at the CBD 
Disagreements among CBD Parties on biofuels and synthetic biology are based on more than 
different approaches to scientific uncertainties; these issues raise geopolitical tensions, 
different approaches to development, and even military considerations.85 However, in the 
context of the CBD, these disagreements have been primarily expressed as disputes over 
science, certainty, and responses to a lack of certainty. While the CBD’s engagement has not 
resulted in concrete guidelines for biofuel production or synthetic biology research or 
application, it has been productive nonetheless – most notably, it has produced a particular 
version of the precautionary approach that responds to a narrow range of scientific 
uncertainties and acts as a placeholder in lieu of political agreement. 
 
                                                        
76 SBSTTA 18, Plenary, 24 June 2014. 
77 Ibid. 
78 SBSTTA 18, Plenary, 24 June 2014, EU & Austria; SBSTTA 18, NEI Contact Group, 26 June 2014, Bolivia. 
79 SBSTTA 18, Plenary, 24 June 2014, Egypt, Costa Rica, & Zambia for the Africa Group. 
80 Recommendation XVIII ‘Synthetic Biology’ para. 1 & 2 (28 June 2014), found in ‘Report of the Eighteenth 
Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice’ (UNEP/CBD/COP/12/3, 28 
June 2014), Annex. 
81 SBSTTA 18, NEI Contact Group, 26 June 2014. 
82 Recommendation XVIII, supra note 80, para. 3. 
83 Susan Leigh Star & James Griesemer, Institutional Ecology, "Translations," and Boundary Objects: Amateurs 
and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Verterbrate Zoology, 1907-39, 19 SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE 387, 
393 (1989). 
84 Noella J. Gray et al. Boundary Objects and Global Consensus: Scalar Narratives of Marine Conservation in 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, 14 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 64, 79 (2014).  
85 See: Nuffield, supra note 18; Dana et al., supra note 26. 
Others have written extensively on what “precaution” could mean, suggesting that assessment 
include questions such as: who benefits from the proposed action and who stands to bear the 
costs; what degree of control potentially affected communities have; what indirect effects may 
exist; what are divergent scientific perspectives; and what alternatives exist.86 With its ‘soft’ 
stakes and comparatively broad participation, the CBD has the institutional background and 
legal flexibility to experiment with such strategies for decision-making in the face of 
scientific uncertainties. Rather than being added to the treaty’s agenda, the designation of 
“New and Emerging Issues” could delineate issues requiring further research, deliberation, 
and exploration – i.e., issues triggering a precautionary stance. This would be a matter of 
shifting interpretation, not re-negotiation.  
 
This could not only re-introduce the New and Emerging Issues mechanism as an active tool; it 
could also establish the CBD as a major international treaty that acknowledges 
indeterminacies and stubborn uncertainties. Emerging technosciences increasingly challenge 
our predictive abilities; the complexities of the global environment seemingly multiply the 
more knowledge we gain. The CBD could chart the path forward for environmental 
governance in this “post-predictive paradigm.”87 But this will require acknowledging a 
broader range of scientific uncertainties, and using a precautionary approach to guide its 
actions where this is a “lack of full scientific certainty.”  
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